The Wake of Paramount v. QVC:  Can A Majority Shareholder Avoid Triggering the Auction Duty During A Merger and Retain a Significant Equity Interest?  Suggestion:  A Pooling of Interests by Azzollini, Phillip J.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 63 Issue 2 Article 5 
1994 
The Wake of Paramount v. QVC: Can A Majority Shareholder Avoid 
Triggering the Auction Duty During A Merger and Retain a 
Significant Equity Interest? Suggestion: A Pooling of Interests 
Phillip J. Azzollini 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Phillip J. Azzollini, The Wake of Paramount v. QVC: Can A Majority Shareholder Avoid Triggering the 
Auction Duty During A Merger and Retain a Significant Equity Interest? Suggestion: A Pooling of Interests, 
63 Fordham L. Rev. 573 (1994). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol63/iss2/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
NOTES
THE WAKE OF PARAMOUNT v. Q VC: CAN A MAJORITY
SHAREHOLDER AVOID TRIGGERING THE AUCTION
DUTY DURING A MERGER AND RETAIN A SIGNIFICANT
EQUITY INTEREST? SUGGESTION: A POOLING
OF INTERESTS
PHILLIP J. AZZOLLINI
INTRODUCTION
Tyler and Julie are fraternal twins, and, like most fourteen year-old
children, they enjoy all varieties of music. Their mother has told them
that they can buy a compact disc player as long as they do not keep it
in the family room. This is not a problem because they have their own
rooms. Because it would not make sense for them to purchase two
compact disc players and duplicate albums, they agree that Tyler will
buy the CD player and Julie will buy several albums. At home, how-
ever, they have trouble deciding in whose room the CD player and
albums will be kept. In Scenario A, Tyler is willing to compromise.
He knows that they have always gotten along well, so he offers to let
Julie keep everything in her room on the condition that she will share
control of the CD player with him. In Scenario B, Julie wants to keep
the CD player in her room more than Tyler does, so she is more will-
ing to compromise. She offers Tyler ten dollars to let her keep the CD
player and albums in her room, and they will still share control. Tyler
agrees after negotiating an additional five dollars in cash from Julie.
The next day Tyler comes home from school and runs up to Julie's
room to listen to his favorite Bruce Springsteen album. He finds that
the door is locked and Julie is inside listening to Mariah Carey's latest
release. He walks away muttering, "I never should have given up
control."
This hypothetical illustration, though simplistic, illustrates how a
"change of control" can occur when two parties agree to merge their
interests. Even the party that grants a premium-like Tyler in Scena-
rio A (when he granted physical control of the CD player to Julie)-
has no guarantee of control after certain types of mergers.
In cases like Scenario A, if Tyler were the board of a corporation,
he certainly could be accused of having made a bad deal for his own-
ers, who would no longer have control over the CD player or recourse
to get it back. In Scenario B, however, Julie could argue that this is
exactly why she paid Tyler fifteen dollars, so that she would have ulti-
mate control. Tyler, having bargained for a premium in cash, would
have a difficult time arguing otherwise.
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Fortunately for "Tyler Inc.," assuming it is a Delaware corporation,
protection for its shareholders is built into the General Corporation
Law of Delaware and has developed through several of the state's
Supreme Court decisions. Scenario A is analogous to a stock-for-
stock merger as Tyler exchanged some of his equity in the CD player
for some of Julie's equity in the albums. Here Delaware law requires,
with some limited exceptions, a vote by the shareholders to approve
the merger.' Scenario B is analogous to a merger where "Tyler Inc."
received a control premium ($15) in return for his grant of a control-
ling interest in the CD player and albums to Julie. In these cases, the
Delaware Supreme Court has required corporate boards to maximize
the company's value for the shareholders.'
These hypothetical transactions between Tyler and Julie are analo-
gous to recent cases testing the outer limits of director discretion when
corporations engage in transactions that have the potential to change
the corporation's control structure. In Paramount Communications
Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.,3 the Delaware Supreme Court held that a
merger transaction negotiated between Paramount and Viacom, Inc.,
where Viacom's Chairman would have owned approximately sixty to
seventy percent of the merged company's outstanding shares, would
constitute a "change of control" in Paramount.' What made this find-
ing significant was the same court's earlier holding in Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,' which required that when a
board recognizes that the company it manages is for sale, its duty
changes from preservation of the corporate entity to maximization of
the company's value at an auction of the company for the sharehold-
ers' benefit.6 The Delaware Supreme Court's holding that a "change
of control" would have occurred if the merger in the QVC case was
consummated required Paramount's board to meet this duty.'
Thus the Paramount board's responsibility to its shareholders re-
quired it to shop for the best deal possible, which, as the Chancery
Court determined, it had not done because it did not properly con-
sider a competing offer.8 In such cases, corporate defensive measures
1. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 251(c) (1993).
2. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986). See also infra text accompanying notes 42-45.
3. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). This case is referred to as QVC throughout this Note
to avoid confusion with the Chancery Court's decision in the same case and another
case in which Paramount Communications is named as a party.
4. Id. at 42-43.
5. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
6. Id. at 182. This duty will be referred to as the "auction duty."
7. Paramount Communications Inc v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48-49
(Del. 1994).
8. QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 1269
(Del. Ch. 1993), aff'd, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). This case is referred to as QVC Chan-
cery throughout this Note to avoid confusion with the Delaware Supreme Court's
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like poison-pills,9 lock-up10 agreements and no-shop clauses" are gen-
erally not enforceable because they interfere with the maximization of
shareholder return in the context of a "corporate auction."' 2 What
has proved problematic for boards, courts, practicing attorneys and
commentators is the actual determination of when a transaction trig-
gers the Revlon duty. In QVC the Delaware Supreme Court held that
the auction duty prescribed in Revlon arises when a transaction either
contemplates a change of control of the company or makes the
breakup of the company inevitable.'"
decision in the same case and another case in which Paramount Communications is
named as a party.
9. The device most frequently associated with the term "poison-pill" is the share
purchase rights plan. In order to prevent a would-be acquiror from acquiring a con-
trolling interest in a target corporation, most rights plans permit the holders of the
rights, usually shareholders other than the acquiror, to purchase shares of the target
company at half price if the acquiror either (1) purchases more than a specified per-
cent (generally 15-50%) of the stock of the target or (2) purchases more than some
specified percentage of the stock of the target and then engages in "self-dealing"
transactions. 1 Martin Lipton & Erica H. Steinberger, Takeovers & Freezeouts
§ 6.03[4][a] (1994). Another type of "poison-pill" is the note purchase rights plan.
Generally, the note purchase right gives the holder a right to "put" his stock to the
issuer in exchange for a specified package of securities if a specified percentage of the
company is acquired by a third party. Id. § 6.03[4][c]. These plans may be validly
adopted as "pre-takeover" defenses. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180-81 (Del. 1986).
10. Lock-up agreements provide friendly acquirors and white knights assurance
that the planned transaction will be consummated without interference from hostile
offers and/or that they will be compensated if the deal is not consummated. For a
long time, lock-ups were generally accepted by courts as a means of inducing a
friendly acquiror to enter into a merger agreement. I Lipton & Steinberger, supra
note 9, § 1.07[2]. However, several 1985 and 1986 cases cast doubt on the use of lock-
ups in certain defensive situations. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hold-
ings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946 (Del. 1985). Other decisions, however, have indicated that lock-up options are
acceptable even in a competitive bidding situation where a proper record is estab-
lished. When a bidding contest arises, however, the courts will closely scrutinize the
auction process to see whether a lock-up is appropriate. 1 Lipton & Steinberger,
supra note 9, § 1.07[2] (citing Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261
(Del. 1989)).
11. A no-shop provision is a covenant by the target company not to solicit or en-
courage anyone to make a competing bid or to engage in any negotiations with or
supply any information to any other person who expresses an interest in acquiring the
target company. "In Revlon, the court held that a no-shop provision, while not illegal
per se, 'is impermissible... when a board's primary duty becomes that of an auction-
eer responsible for selling the company to the highest bidder.'" Id.
§ 5A.03[4][a](quoting Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173, 184 (Del. 1986)).
12. See generally Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185 (invalidating protective measures that
interfered with maximization of value for shareholders where sale of control
occurred).
13. Paramount Communications Inc v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 47-48
(Del. 1994).
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Before QVC, however, in Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time,
Inc., 4 the Delaware Supreme Court stated that there were generally
two circumstances, without excluding other possibilities, that impli-
cated the duties arising under the Revlon case:15
[1.] [W]hen a corporation initiates an active bidding process seek-
ing to sell itself or to effect a business reorganization involving a
clear break-up of the company.
[2.] [W]here, in response to a bidder's offer, a target abandons its
long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction [also] in-
volving the breakup of the company. 17
In Time, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a merger agreement
between Time, Inc. and Warner Communication, Inc. did not create
Revlon duties for Time directors.'" The court concluded that the
transaction did not make the breakup of Time inevitable and that the
merger was consistent with the board's long-term plans for the com-
pany.' 9 The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that Warner
shareholders would have received a premium in Time shares to con-
summate the merger and ultimately would have owned sixty-two per-
cent of the merged entity.20 By any measure, the Delaware Supreme
Court's Time opinion implied that courts would not interfere with
business combinations that resulted from a board's thoughtful, well-
planned, long-term strategy.
In QVC, however, the Delaware Supreme Court distinguished the
proposed Paramount-Viacom merger from the proposed Time-
Warner merger, holding that the circumstances of the former resulted
in a sale of control and therefore implicated Revlon duties for Para-
mount's board.21 At the same time the Delaware Supreme Court
seemed to recast Time's meaning and implications by expanding the
range of transactions that could trigger Revlon. The QVC decision
suggests that companies controlled by individuals, or groups, owning
controlling blocks of shares cannot participate in friendly mergers
without running the risk of putting the partner corporation "in play 22
if the individual or block will continue to hold a significant equity in-
terest in the combined corporation.
14. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). This case is referred to as Time throughout this
Note to avoid confusion with the Delaware Chancery Court's decision in the same
case and another case in which Paramount Communications is named as a party.
15. Id. at 1150.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1151.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1146.
21. Paramount Communications Inc v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del.
1994).
22. As used in this Note the phrase "in play" means that the entity becomes com-
mitted to an auction for control if another bidder makes a competing offer.
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This Note distinguishes the Time and QVC cases. It highlights how
QVC casts new light on the Time decision and "tightens the leash" on
directors in the exercise of their fiduciary obligation to shareholders
when assessing transactions affecting a corporation's structure. It also
suggests a possible way in which companies controlled by shareholder
blocks may merge with other companies without implicating Revlon.23
Part I introduces the legal principles necessary to the discussion of the
above issues: the business judgment rule, the standard established by
the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co.,2 4 and the Revlon standard. Part II traces the evolution of the
Revlon standard by discussing and comparing the Time and QVC
cases. Part III argues that the QVC decision creates an additional
hurdle for companies controlled by single shareholders or groups
owning blocks of shares that wish to participate in the merger market,
as opposed to corporations that may be similar in size but have owner-
ship spread among many shareholders. This Part then argues that the
boards of such companies can avoid Revlon duties by including pro-
tective devices for non-controlling stockholders in the terms of a
merger agreement; specifically, the boards of such companies can
avoid triggering the Revlon duty by structuring mergers as poolings of
interests, an accounting term for a pure common stock merger. This
Note concludes by suggesting that Delaware's courts should not apply
Revlon where mergers are structured as poolings of interests.
I. LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND BACKGROUND
A discussion of some legal principles in the area of corporate gov-
ernance provides a useful foundation for the analysis that follows in
Parts II and III.
A. Delaware Law and the Business Judgment Rule
Section 141 of Delaware's General Corporation Law contains the
general grant of powers given to boards of directors of companies in-
corporated in Delaware32 In addition to the powers conferred in sec-
23. This Note does not purport to define the phrase "change of control." It in-
stead suggests a form of transaction that provides enough structural protection to
non-controlling shareholders so that it should not trigger the Revlon duty as defined
by the QVC decision.
24. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
25. Section 141(a) states:
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as
may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorpora-
tion. If any such provision is made in the certificate of incorporation, the
powers and duties conferred or imposed upon the board of directors by this
chapter shall be exercised or performed to such extent and by such person or
persons as shall be provided in the certificate of incorporation.
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1993).
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tion 141, the board may deal in the corporation's stock.2 6 Thus, the
board may offer shares as consideration for the purchase of an asset,
or offer a benefit, such as a stock purchase rights plan, to the share-
holders as a defensive measure to prevent a hostile takeover.2 7 Fi-
nally, a board has a fundamental duty to protect the corporate
enterprise, which includes stockholders, from harm reasonably per-
ceived, irrespective of its source. 8 The directors' duty does not in-
clude an obligation to maximize the immediate value of the
corporation or its shares; 9 therefore, directors, when acting deliber-
ately, in an informed manner, and in the good faith pursuit of corpo-
rate interests, may follow a course designed to achieve long-term
value even at the cost of immediate value maximization.3 0
Courts have developed the "business judgment rule" as the stan-
dard for reviewing corporate board decisions challenged by stockhold-
ers.3 The business judgment rule is "a presumption that in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was
in the best interests of the company. '32 Thus, Delaware's courts hesi-
tate to review board decisions themselves, but focus instead on the
circumstances surrounding the decisions. If these circumstances show
26. Section 160(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law states: "Every cor-
poration may purchase, redeem, receive, take or otherwise acquire, own and hold,
sell, lend, exchange, transfer or otherwise, dispose of, pledge, use and otherwise deal
in its own shares." Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 160(a) (1993).
27. See 1 Lipton & Steinberger, supra note 9, § 6.03[4]. The directors, however,
are prohibited from acting in such a manner if the sole purpose is to entrench them-
selves in office. See, e.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964).
28. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
29. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $
94,514, at 93,277 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). This case is re-
ferred to as Time Chancery throughout this Note to avoid confusion with the Dela-
ware Supreme Court's decision in the same case and another case in which
Paramount Communications is named as a party.
30. Id.
31. Delaware case law repeatedly suggests that a high level of deference should be
accorded to board decisions. E.g., Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 191-92 (Del. 1988)
(dismissing challenge to board's decision to repurchase block of shares from dissident
shareholder); Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (af-
firming adoption of a share purchase rights plan); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) ("[A] court will not substitute its judgment for that
of the board if the latter's decision 'can be attributed to any rational business pur-
pose.' ") (citation omitted); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) ("Ab-
sent an abuse of discretion, [a board's] judgment will be respected by the courts.");
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717,720 (Del. 1971) ("[A board's] decisions will
not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business purpose. A court
under such circumstances will not substitute its own notions of what is or is not sound
business judgment.").
32. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (Del. 1984). For a detailed discussion of the devel-
opment of the business judgment rule, see Dennis J. Block et al., The Business Judg-
ment Rule 1-49 (4th ed. 1993).
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good faith on the part of the board, the courts will dismiss challenges
to a board's actual decision even if it proved to be a poor one.
When the facts surrounding a decision raise the possibility that a
board may be acting primarily in its own interest, there is no longer a
presumption in favor of the board. In such cases the board must meet
an enhanced standard which requires judicial examination at the
threshold of the action before a court may confer the protection of the
business judgment rule upon the decision. 3 Therefore, when address-
ing a challenge to a board decision and determining whether that deci-
sion should be accorded the protection of the business judgment rule,
a court must consider the circumstances surrounding the decision
before determining if the business judgment rule is applicable.-"
When considering challenges to a board's actions in the context of a
business combination or corporate takeover, Delaware's courts gener-
ally look to the Unocal and Revlon standards to determine if the
board has met its obligations to the shareholders.
B. Permissible Responses to Takeover Threats
The Unoca135 case introduced the modern standard used by the Del-
aware courts when assessing whether a board's response to a takeover
threat is entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule. This
standard requires a two-part analysis of any defensive measures taken
by a board in response to a threat to corporate control. First, the di-
rectors must not have acted solely or primarily out of a desire to per-
petuate themselves in office; therefore, the court must determine if
the measure was motivated by reasonable investigation and good faith
concern for the welfare of the corporation and its stockholders. 6 Sec-
33. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
34. Different facts require different analyses before the business judgment rule
may be applied. For example, when reviewing the decision of a Special Litigation
Committee not to proceed with a derivative lawsuit by a shareholder against a corpo-
rate officer, a court actually may use its own business judgment to determine whether
the litigation should have been pursued, even if the court finds that the deci-
sionmakers acted in good faith and were independent. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,
430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981). Yet such interference with a board's judgment
would not be acceptable when reviewing, for example, a decision to close a factory, or
not to play baseball games at night, because there is less danger that the board is
acting in its own interests. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (I11. App. Ct.
1968) (refusing to interfere with board's choice not to offer night baseball games).
35. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
36. Id. at 955. The Unocal standard can be described as the offspring of Cheff v.
Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964), as the first step of the analysis was taken from that
case. The Unocal court went on to admonish that "[w]e must bear in mind the inher-
ent danger in the purchase of shares with corporate funds to remove a threat to cor-
porate policy when a threat to control is involved. The directors are of necessity
confronted with a conflict of interest, and an objective decision is difficult." 493 A.2d
at 955 (quoting Bennet v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962)).
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ond, if a defensive measure is to fall within the realm of the business
judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.37
Defensive measures became increasingly important during the
1980s, even in the absence of a specific raider, as the possibility of a
hostile takeover was a threat to any company at any time.38 Because
of the ever-present possibility of a hostile takeover interfering with
strategic plans and transactions, many corporations adopted measures
to deter unwelcome suitors,39 and such measures normally survived
37. 493 A.2d at 955. This entails an analysis by the directors of the nature of the
threat and its effect on the corporate enterprise. Factors to consider include: inade-
quacy of the price offered, nature and timing of the offer, legal issues, impact on
parties other than the shareholders, risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of the
securities offered in exchange. The board should also consider long-term and short-
term shareholder interests. Id. at 955-56.
In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court considered the propriety of an injunction
granted by the Chancery Court to prevent a stock exchange plan enacted to thwart a
hostile takeover. Mesa, a company that was perceived as participating in the practice
of "greenmail" (see infra note 47 for definition), had made a two-part tender offer for
Unocal which Unocal's board had determined was inadequate.
As a defensive measure Unocal's board adopted a plan that would require the com-
pany to buy back its own shares at a price significantly higher than Mesa's offer if
Mesa were to acquire a specific percentage of shares. This planned buy-back ex-
cluded Mesa from participation. Mesa challenged this aspect of the plan.
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Chancery Court's decision, which en-
joined Unocal from implementing this defense, based on findings that the buy-back
offer was made in the good-faith belief that Mesa's offer was inadequate, that the
action was informed and taken with due care, and that the action was reasonable in
response to a "greenmail" threat. Id. at 959.
38. Much of the responsibility for the activity of the 1980s has been attributed to
Michael Milken, head of high-yield securities at Drexel Burnham Lambert, as his abil-
ity to raise huge sums of money in relatively little time meant that any size corpora-
tion could be a target. As one author described:
The big money was in the struggle for corporate control, in mergers and
acquisitions and, increasingly, in a variation that seemed even more promis-
ing to Milken: the leveraged buyout .... It was clearly just a matter of time
before Milken, having quietly nurtured his financing network into a huge
money-spewing engine, burst upon the takeover scene.... Milken often told
[an associate], there would be no deal that he couldn't do, no company so
big that it need not fear his power. "We're going to tee-up GM, Ford and
IBM.... And make them cringe."
James B. Stewart, Den of Thieves 57 (1991).
39. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. Courts have upheld a wide vari-
ety of takeover defense tactics. See, e.g., Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279
(Del. 1989) (finding that management buyout was fair response to threat posed by a
reputed "greenmailer" who had acquired a significant portion of the company); Ivan-
hoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987) (upholding asset
sale and dividend to shareholders in response to hostile tender offer); Moran v.
Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (approving preferred purchase rights
plan that would dilute raider's holdings). See also Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646
F.2d 271 (7th Cir.) (upholding corporation's entry into acquisition transaction to frus-
trate potential raider with antitrust complications), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
Other defenses that have been upheld include "white knight" and "scorched earth"
defenses. A "white knight" is an acquiror either preferred by management or invited
to bid for the target corporation. See Andrea Lowenthal, Note, Corporate Takeovers
and the Business Judgment Rule: The Second Circuit Puts Target Corporations on the
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Unocal scrutiny.4° Where a court is asked to review a transaction ap-
proved by a corporation's board that would be construed as a sale of
the corporation or could result in the break-up of the company, the
Revlon decision prescribes the applicable standard of review for deter-
mining whether the business judgment rule applies to the decision. 1
The difference between the Unocal and Revlon standards is that the
former is used to assess reactions to threats to corporate policy or con-
tinuity, while the latter is used to assess actions taken by the board to
effect its own policy choices that might result in a change to the corpo-
ration's control structure or long-term strategy. When the policy
choice in question is a departure from established policy in response
to a perceived threat, the standards may overlap.
The Revlon duty requires that a board, upon recognition that the
corporation is for sale, must maximize the company's value at an auc-
tion for the stockholders' benefit. 2 The board only retains discretion
Auction Block, 53 Brook. L. Rev. 409, 414 n.23 (1987). A target employs a "scorched
earth" defense by selling off valuable assets that may have initially attracted a poten-
tial bidder in order to reduce interest in a takeover. Id. at 419 n.48.
40. Lowenthal, supra note 40, at 419 n.48.
41. 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1985). In Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court af-
firmed a lower court decision enjoining the Revlon board from consummating a trans-
action with a "white knight" bidder in an attempt to thwart the efforts of a hostile
party to acquire Revlon. The transactions in question were: (a) an option granting
the "white knight," Forstmann Little Co., the right to purchase certain Revlon assets
at a specified price (a lock-up arrangement); (b) a $25 million cancellation fee to be
paid if the transaction were aborted; and (c) a no-shop clause meaning that Revlon
could only deal with Forstmann Little if the company were to be taken over. Id. at
175.
As in Unocal, this case involved an unfriendly bid for Revlon that the Revlon board
had rejected as insufficient. In Revlon, however, the board, while considering the
hostile offer, began to examine possible alternatives to the offer, including a leveraged
buyout by Forstmann Little. Id. at 178.
The facts of the case show that Revlon's board granted several advantages to Forst-
mann Little: besides the lock-up and cancellation fee, Forstmann Little had financial
information about Revlon that the competitor did not. Therefore the parties were not
negotiating on an even playing field. The court's analysis of Revlon's earlier defen-
sive measures-a corporate buyout plan and stock exchange offer for 10 million
shares---would have survived a Unocal analysis. See id. at 181. The Revlon board's
fatal mistake was its decision to search for an alternative bidder
The Revlon board's authorization permitting management to negotiate a
merger or buyout with a third party was a recognition that the company was
for sale. The duty of the board... thus changed from the preservation of
Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a
sale for the stockholders' benefit.
Id. at 182.
The grants of the asset lock-up provision, the no-shop clause, and the cancellation
fee were deemed breaches of the directors' duty of care because these devices inter-
fered with the board's ability to maximize the company's value for the shareholders.
Id. at 182-85. Because "[n]o ... defensive measure can be sustained when it repre-
sents a breach of the directors' fundamental duty of care," these measures were inval-
idated. Id. Ultimately the board was required to conduct an auction for control of
the corporation, which resulted in the takeover of the company by the hostile bidder.
42. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
1994]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
over the type of auction procedure to implement in carrying out this
duty.4 3 According to the Delaware Supreme Court's most recent
proclamation in QVC, the Revlon duties are implicated when a corpo-
ration undertakes a transaction that will cause a change in corporate
control44 or a breakup of the corporate entity.45
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE REVLON TRIGGER
The Delaware Supreme Court's formulation of the various circum-
stances requiring a corporation's board to meet Revlon's requirements
evolved primarily in three stages. This part discusses the cases which
comprise the stages in the Revlon trigger's development.
A. Barkan v. Amsted Industries
In Barkan v. Amsted Industries,46 the Delaware Supreme Court at-
tempted to define the type of event that would trigger Revlon obliga-
tions. In Barkan, Amsted Industries' board of directors had become
concerned that Charles Hurwitz, a reputed "greenmailer," was acquir-
ing significant amounts of Amsted common stock.47 In response to
this threat, the board adopted a common stock purchase rights plan (a
poison-pill) as a deterrent.48 Next, the board considered a leveraged
buyout involving an Employee Stock Ownership Plan ("ESOP"); ulti-
mately this resulted in a proposal by the ESOP's representatives and
senior management to purchase Amsted. 9
The board's special committee assigned to investigate these strate-
gies had hired an investment banking firm which opined that the price
offered in the proposal was high in the range of fairness.50 After ne-
gotiating a modest increase in the cash component of the offer, the
special committee approved the transaction and recommended it to
the full board, which also voted its approval.5 1 Hurwitz, the green-
mailer, and four other shareholders challenged the adequacy of the
transaction in Delaware's Chancery Court.5 2 This challenge was set-
tled before any discovery was conducted after another slight increase
43. Ronald J. Rinaldi, Note, Radically Altered States: Entering the "Revlon Zone,"
90 Colum. L. Rev. 760, 763 (1990).
44. Paramount Communications Inc v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del.
1994).
45. Id.
46. 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989).
47. Id. at 1282. The term "greenmail" refers to stock accumulation coupled with
threats of takeover attempts or proxy fights to force a buyback at a premium. The
greenmailer's goal is not to acquire the company but to be bought out at a good price.
1 Lipton & Steinberger, supra note 9, § 1.06[7].
48. Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1282.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1283.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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was added to the package. 3 Finally, the buyout offer closed with the
tender of eighty-nine percent of Amsted's outstanding stock.-
Barkan, a shareholder, filed his action one week later and joined
the prior class action which, although settled, had not received final
approval from the Chancery Court s.5  After the Chancellor approved
the settlement, Barkan appealed. 6 He argued, among other things,
that the Amsted directors breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty
and care by not implementing procedures designed to maximize Am-
sted's price when the sale became inevitable, thus violating Revlon's
requirements. 7
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the approval of the settle-
ment, holding that the board had not violated its fiduciary duty to the
shareholders.58 The court also provided some guidance on Revlon:
We believe that the general principles announced in [Revlon] ...
govern this case and every case in which a fundamental change of
corporate control occurs or is contemplated.... However, Revlon
does not demand that every change in the control of a Delaware
corporation be preceded by a heated bidding contest. Revlon is
merely one of an unbroken line of cases that seek to prevent the
conflicts of interests that arise in the field of mergers and acquisi-
tions by demanding that directors act with scrupulous concern for
fairness to shareholders. 59
This case suggested that any transaction which results in a "fundamen-
tal change of corporate control" implicates Revlon duties. In Time,
however, less than three months later, the Delaware Supreme Court
appeared to limit this holding by defining general circumstances that
would implicate Revlon duties.
B. Paramount v. Time
On March 3, 1989, the boards of Time and Warner authorized a
merger agreement. 60 The agreement created a twenty-four member
board equally divided between incumbent board members of the two
companies.6 1 To protect editorial independence in Time's magazine
divisions, editors would report to a special committee consisting of
two former Time directors and one former Warner director.' The
merger agreement also provided a parallel structure for management
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1281.
57. Id. at 1285.
58. Id. at 1286-88.
59. Id. at 1286.
60. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 1
94,514, at 93,270 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
61. Id. at 93,269.
62. Id.
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of Warner's relationship with creative artists.63 J. Richard Munro,
Time's CEO, and Stephen Ross, CEO of Warner, were to share the
chief executive officer position until 1990 when N. J. Nicholas would
succeed Munro. Then, upon Ross' retirement, Nicholas would remain
as the lone chief executive officer.64
As for the stockholders, the transaction was structured as a stock
for stock exchange. Time's board agreed to an exchange ratio of .465
Time shares for each Warner share.65 This represented approxi-
mately a twelve percent premium for Warner's shareholders as the
actual market value of each Warner share was approximately .38 of
each Time share. 66 Ultimately, had the merger been consummated,
Warner's stockholders would have owned sixty-two percent of the
common stock and voting power of Time-Warner.67
In Time, the original merger agreement between Time and Warner
included a share exchange agreement 68 and a no-shop 69 provision.
While noting that these protective measures were not at issue in this
case because the transaction was ultimately abandoned, the Delaware
Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that inclusion of these de-
fensive measures did not violate the Unocal standard of care in this
case.
70
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 93,270.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 93,279. Even if Warner's shareholders had not been granted a premium,
they would have owned a majority of the new entity. Warner had approximately 180
million shares outstanding (17,292,747 divided by 9.4%, id. at 93,270), while the mar-
ket ratio of Time shares to Warner was .38 per share. Therefore, at market, Time
would have been required to issue approximately 68.4 million shares. This, compared
to the approximately 57 million shares of Time which were already outstanding
(Time's charter authorized up to 200 million shares, id. at 93,266), still would have
given Warner's shareholders a majority interest in Time-Warner.
68. The share exchange agreement provided that Time would receive 9.4% of
Warner's outstanding common stock and Warner would receive 11.1% of Time's out-
standing shares if either party triggered the exchange. Id. at 93,270.
69. The no-shop clause prevented Time from considering any other consolidation
proposals, regardless of their merits. Time did so at Warner's insistence. Warner did
not want to be left "on the auction block" for an unfriendly suitor, if Time withdrew
from the deal. Id. at 93,271.
70. Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1151 n.15 (Del.
1990). The Delaware Supreme Court stated:
Although the legality of various safety devices adopted to protect the origi-
nal agreement is not a central issue, there is substantial evidence to support
each of the trial court's related conclusions. Thus, the court found that the
concept of the Share Exchange Agreement predated any takeover threat by
Paramount and had been adopted for a rational business purpose: to deter
Time and Warner from being "put in play" by their March 4 [a]greement.
The court further found that Time had adopted the "no-shop" clause at
Warner's insistence and for Warner's protection.
[Vol. 63
QVC & POOLING OF INTERESTS
On June 7, 1989, Paramount Communications challenged the Time-
Warner merger with a tender offer of $175 per share, in cash, for all
outstanding Time shares. This offer caused the companies to termi-
nate the merger and recast the transaction as an outright purchase of
Warner by Time.7 ' Under New York Stock Exchange rules, the
merger agreement would have required approval by Time's share-
holders because of the number of shares to be issued.' After Para-
mount's bid, Time's board felt that such approval would be
"problematic."73 The purchase agreement, however, did not require
shareholder approval.74
In response to the new agreement, Paramount raised its offer to
$200 per share.7" The Time board rejected Paramount's offer as insuf-
ficient, concluding that the Warner purchase offered greater long-term
value for the stockholders and did not pose a threat to Time's "cul-
ture."76 After its $200 offer was rejected, Paramount filed suit in Del-
aware seeking an injunction to restrain Time from completing the
purchase transaction. Paramount argued that Time's board had
breached its duty to Time's shareholders by not considering the Para-
mount offer.77
Paramount argued only that Time's board breached its duty under
Unocal by approving the purchase transaction over Paramount's of-
fer.78 Time prevailed. Delaware's Supreme Court found that Time
reasonably responded to the threat that Paramount posed to Time's
71. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
94,514, at 93,265 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). The agreement
was structured in two tiers. Time made an immediate all-cash offer for 51% of
Warner's outstanding stock at $70 per share. The remaining 49% of stock would be
purchased at a later date for a mixture of cash and securities worth $70 per share. Id.
To provide funds for this outright purchase, Time assumed $7-10 billion dollars of
debt. Id. at 93,274.
72. Id. at 93,270. The New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual
§ 312.03(c) (1990) requires, as a prerequisite to listing, shareholder approval prior to
the issuance of securities if: common stock or securities convertible into or exercisa-
ble for common stock are to be issued in any transactions, other than a public offering
for cash, and (i) if the common stock has or will have upon issuance voting power
equal to or in excess of 20% of the voting power outstanding before the issuance of
such stock or securities convertible into or exercisable for common stock, or (ii) the
number of shares of common stock to be issued is or will be equal to or in excess of
20% of the number of shares of common stock outstanding before the issuance of the
stock.
73. Time Chancery at 93,273.
74. Id. at 93,272.
75. Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1149 (Del.
1990).
76. Id.
77. Time Chancery at 93,265.
78. Time, 571 A.2d at 1149. Paramount argued that Time's leveraged buyout
agreement to purchase Warner was an unreasonable reaction to the perceived threat
posed by Paramount's tender offer. Time Chancery at 93,281. The Delaware
Supreme Court, applying Unocal, determined that Time's board reasonably, and in
good faith, determined that Paramount's offer posed a threat to corporate policy and
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strategic plans for the company, which included a merger with
Warner. 9
The shareholder-plaintiffs, who had joined Paramount's action, ad-
vanced a different argument-that the Time board breached its Rev-
lon duty."° The shareholder-plaintiffs argued that Revlon duties were
triggered by the original merger agreement because of: (1) the fact
that Warner shareholders would own sixty-two percent of the merged
entity;81 (2) the director's perceptions that they were putting the com-
pany up "for sale;"'8 2 (3) the adoption of various defensive measures in
the agreement;8 3 and (4) the assertion that the merger with Warner
would preclude Time shareholders from ever receiving a control pre-
mium for their Time interests8 4
The ultimate issue was summarized as follows: "Under what cir-
cumstances must a board of directors abandon an in-place plan of cor-
porate development in order to provide its shareholders with the
option to elect and realize an immediate control premium?""5 In
other words, when does a transaction trigger the Revlon duty?
Focusing on the distribution of ownership contemplated before and
after the merger, the Chancery Court held that the terms of the origi-
nal agreement did not constitute a "change of control" sufficient to
invoke Revlon duties:
I am entirely persuaded of the soundness of the view that it is irrele-
vant for purposes of making such a determination that 62% of
Time-Warner stock would have been held by former Warner share-
holders .... But where, as here, the shares of both constituent cor-
porations are widely held, corporate control can be expected to
remain unaffected by a stock for stock merger.... When the specif-
stockholder interests, and that the board was not motivated by entrenchment or self
interest. Time, 571 A.2d at 1153.
79. Id. at 1155. Paramount argued that, assuming its tender offer posed a threat,
Time's response was unreasonable because it precluded Time's shareholders from ac-
cepting the tender offer or receiving a control premium in the immediately foresee-
able future. Id. at 1154. Delaware's Supreme Court concluded that the directors
were not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short term
shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy. Id.
at 1154. Because the transaction was not aimed at "cramming down" on its share-
holders management's alternative offer, the response was reasonably related and pro-
portionate to the threat. Id. at 1154-55. "In essence, Paramount was asking the
courts to enjoin Time from acquiring an asset because Paramount preferred to effect
an acquisition of Time without that asset." Brief for Appellee at 38, Paramount Com-
munications Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 635 A.2d 1245 (Del. Ch. 1993) (Nos. 427 &
428).
80. Time, 571 A.2d at 1149.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,514, at 93,278 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
85. Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1149 (Del.
1990).
[Vol. 63
QVC & POOLING OF INTERESTS
ics of that situation are reviewed ... neither corporation could be
said to be acquiring the other. Control of both remained in a large,
fluid, changeable and changing market.86
The Chancellor continued:
The existence of a block of stock in the hands of a single share-
holder or a group with loyalty to each other does have real conse-
quences to the financial value of "minority" stock. The law offers
some protection to such shares through the imposition of a fiduciary
duty upon controlling shareholders .... The shareholders of Time
would have "suffered" dilution, of course, but they would suffer the
same type of dilution upon the . . . public distribution of new
stock."'
Addressing the stockholders' second argument, that they would be
precluded from ever receiving a control premium, the Chancery Court
held that the transaction did not legally prevent a later sale of the
merged entity.'m Thus a would-be acquiror has no right to preempt
the directors' exercise of power pending the outcome of an acquisition
battle unless the acts are found to be defensive in nature and a viola-
tion of Unocal's standard of care.89
The Chancery Court then returned to the original merger agree-
ment. First it noted that Delaware law created no right in the Time
shareholders to vote on the Warner merger," although NYSE rules
did.91 Then the Chancellor stated: "I am aware of no principle, stat-
ute or rule of corporation law that would hold that once a board ap-
proves an agreement of merger, it loses power to reconsider that
86. 7Time Chancery at 93,279-280.
87. Id. at 93,280.
88. Id.
89. Id
90. Delaware's General Corporation Law states:
Notwithstanding the requirements of subsection (c) of this section, unless
required by its certificate of incorporation, no vote of stockholders of a con-
stituent corporation surviving a merger shall be necessary to authorize a
merger if (1) the agreement of merger does not amend in any respect the
certificate of incorporation of such constituent corporation, (2) each share of
stock of such constituent corporation outstanding immediately prior to the
effective date of the merger is to be an identical outstanding or treasury
share of the surviving corporation after the effective date of the merger, and
(3) either no shares of common stock of the surviving corporation and no
shares, securities or obligations convertible into such stock are to be issued
or delivered under the plan of merger, or the authorized unissued shares or
the treasury shares of common stock of the surviving corporation to be is-
sued or delivered under the plan of merger plus those initially issuable upon
conversion of any other shares, securities or obligations to be issued or deliv-
ered under such plan do not exceed 20% of the shares of common stock of
such constituent corporation outstanding immediately prior to the effective
date of the merger ....
Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8, § 251(f) (1993).
91. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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action prior to a shareholder vote."'  Therefore, even though the re-
casting of the merger transaction as a purchase was a vehicle for
avoiding a shareholder vote that management suspected it would lose,
the action did not violate the board's fiduciary duty because the
board's action was within its discretion. Ultimately, this justified
treating the original merger agreement as a moot transaction-and
the court could disregard any implications it may have created.
The Delaware Supreme Court, however, rejected the Revlon claims
on different grounds. The court held that there was no "substantial
evidence to conclude that Time's board, in negotiating with Warner,
made the dissolution or break-up of the corporate entity inevitable, as
was the case in Revlon."93 The court then proceeded to instruct that,
without excluding other possibilities, generally two circumstances im-
plicate Revlon duties: (1) when a corporation voluntarily initiates an
active bidding process to sell itself or to effect a business reorganiza-
tion involving a clear break-up of the company, 94 and (2) where a tar-
get abandons its long-term strategy in response to a bidder's offer and
seeks an alternative transaction also involving the breakup of the
company.9 5
The Delaware Supreme Court did not decide whether the Chancery
Court correctly ignored the original agreement's anticipated concen-
tration of ownership of the corporation in the hands of Warner's
shareholders. Its silence on the issue seemed at the very least to imply
that the Supreme Court did not disagree with the Chancery Court on
this point.
The Time decision received mixed reviews from commentators.96
Most agreed, however, that the decision implied that greater defer-
92. Time Chancery at 93,281.
93. Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del.
1990).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Most of the commentary focuses on the effect the decision had in limiting the
scope of Unocal. See, e.g., Paul E. Bums, Timing is Paramount: The Impact of Para-
mount v. Time on the Law of Hostile Takeovers, 19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 761, 803 (1992)
("The Paramount case shows that Unocal's enhanced business judgment rule has de-
veloped into an effective compromise between the corporation's need for power to be
exercised by a knowledgeable and informed board of directors and the shareholders'
need to be protected from the 'omnipresent specter' of board entrenchment."); Rob-
ert E. Bull, Note, Directors' Responsibilities and Shareholders Interests in the After-
math of Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 65 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 885, 915
(1989) ("The Time shareholders' interests, as well as the interests of shareholders
similarly situated in the future, have been severely lessened by the court's decision.");
Daniel S. Cahill & Stephen P. Wink, Note, Time and Time Again the Board is Para-
mount: The Evolution of the Unocal Standard and the Revlon Trigger Through Para-
mount v. Time, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 159, 210 (1990) ("The Time Decision was a
reasoned solution to the competing interests of the business judgment rule and the
intrinsic fairness test."); E. Ashton Johnston, Note, Defenders of the Corporate Bas-
tion in the Revlon Zone: Paramount Communications Inc v. Time, Inc., 40 Cath. U. L.
Rev. 155, 185 (1990) ("The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Paramount disre-
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ence would be paid to board decisions involving corporate strategy
even where the long-term benefit is not apparent to the average share-
holder.97 In addition, the Time decision appeared to narrow Revlon's
applicability. Because the Time court chose to list the general scena-
rios that would implicate Revlon, it was unclear whether Barkan's
"change of control" formulation was still a viable definition of the
Revlon trigger. Typical interpretations of Time reflected the belief
that the case materially reduced Revlon's applicability, 98 and even the
Delaware courts acknowledged the inconsistency between the Time
and Barkan holdings. 99
The first case to suggest the difficulty posed by the Time holding
was In re Wheelabrator Technologies Shareholders Litigation."ce
Waste Management, Inc., after acquiring a twenty-two percent equity
interest in Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc. and designating four of its
eleven directors, decided to increase its ownership interest to fifty-five
percent. 10 ' Wheelabrator's board unanimously approved the transac-
tion, which took the form of a stock-for-stock merger in which each
share of Wheelabrator common stock would be converted into .574
shares of newly issued Wheelabrator stock and .469 shares of Waste
Management stock." 2
Several Wheelabrator shareholders challenged this transaction as a
change of control implicating Revlon duties; they also claimed that the
board violated its duty by not conducting a market check to assure
itself that there were no superior alternative transactions. 10 3 The
Chancery Court did not decide whether Revlon duties were implicated
because the plaintiffs had not pleaded allegations to support the con-
clusion that the board breached its duties, even if Revlon had ap-
plied." 4 The Chancellor, however, did raise the following issue:
Under Barkan it appears that a board becomes subject to Revlon
duties whenever "a fundamental change of corporate control occurs
or is contemplated" ... and that the nature of those duties depends
gards important shareholder considerations, including shareholders' interests in in-
creasing the value of their ownership in a corporation.").
97. Bums, supra note 97, at 795-96; Bull, supra note 97, 910-11; Cahill & Wink,
supra note 97, at 205; Johnston, supra note 97, at 186.
98. For example, one commentator suggested that: "Revlon applies only if the
board actively initiates a bidding process for the firm or, as in Revlon itself, goes
about breaking up the firm in response to a hostile bid." Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corpora-
tions, Markets and Courts, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1931, 1944 nA5 (1991). See also Stephen
M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lockups in Negotiated Corporate
Acquisitions, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 239, 312-13 (1990) ("[O]nly those negotiated acquisi-
tions that contemplate breaking-up the target will trigger Revlon.... [Ejven though
the negotiated acquisition results in a change of control.").
99. See infra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
100. No. 11495, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 196 (Del. Ch. June 1, 1992).
101. Id. at *3.
102. Id.
103. Id at *30.
104. Id.
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upon particular factual circumstances. Barkan holds that when only
one bidder is present, the directors have a duty to be adequately
informed of the value of their own company before committing it to
a change-of-control transaction. If the directors act without that
knowledge they breach that duty, unless they first conduct an auc-
tion or canvass the market.' 0 5
The Chancery Court noted that the premise of Time appeared more
narrow:
Because Barkan appears not to fit within [Time's] categories, it
would be difficult to conclude with confidence that the Barkan for-
mulation was intended as one of [Time's] "other possibilities." It is,
of course, possible that [Time] rejects the more generic Barkan for-
mulation of when Revlon duties arise, and, thus, overrules Barkan
sub silentio on that point. Absent a clear indication to that effect by
our Supreme Court, however, I am not prepared to so conclude....
Fortunately, this case does not require the Court to reconcile the
standard of [Time] with that of Barkan.106
Delaware's Supreme Court resolved the dichotomy between these
cases in Paramount Communications v. QVC Network. 10 7
C. Paramount v. QVC
On September 12, 1993, Paramount and Viacom entered into a
merger agreement in which Paramount's shareholders would receive a
combination of Viacom shares and cash valued at $69.14 per share.108
The combined value per share constituted a premium over the market
price of approximately fifteen dollars. 10 9 Paramount's board under-
stood that after the merger Sumner Redstone, chairman of Viacom,
would emerge as the controlling shareholder of the new entity as he
already owned approximately a seventy-seven percent interest in
Viacom's class A stock and a sixty-two precent interest in its class B
stock. 110 Redstone would have owned approximately seventy percent
of the new entity if the transaction had been consummated."' Martin
Davis, Paramount's CEO, would remain as CEO of the combined en-
tity despite the change in stock ownership.112
The agreement contained: (1) a lock-up provision which granted
Viacom an option to purchase up to 19.9% of Paramount's outstand-
ing common stock at the merger price;113 (2) a no-shop clause;"14 and
105. Id. at *25-26.
106. Id. at *27-28.
107. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
108. QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 1250
(Del. Ch. 1993), aff'd, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
109. Id. at 1251.
110. Id. at 1247.
111. Id. at 1251.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1250-51.
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(3) a $100 million termination feel'- payable if Paramount cancelled
the merger in favor of another transaction. In addition, the board, in
agreeing to merge with Viacom, agreed to drop its poison-pill stock
purchase plan, which would have impeded the merger. 1 6
On September 20, QVC Network proposed a merger with Para-
mount that would grant each Paramount shareholder a combination
of shares and cash valued at eighty dollars per share.1 7 Paramount's
Davis had a history of animosity with QVC's CEO, Barry Diller, and
it was apparent that he and the board preferred the Viacom transac-
tion over QVC's proposal. On October 21, QVC, frustrated by Para-
mount's lack of responsiveness to its offer, launched a hostile tender
offer." 8 On October 25, Viacom launched its own tender offer, hav-
ing amended the terms of its original offer." 9 By November 6 Viacom
had increased its offer to eighty-five dollars per share. 2 The
amended agreement included the lock-up, no-shop, and termination-
fee clauses.' 2' In response, QVC increased its offer to ninety dollars
per share, contingent on its ability to invalidate the lock-up option and
poison-pill defense which Paramount's board still had in place.' 22
QVC proceeded by filing an action for an injunction against Para-
mount, its directors, and Viacom to prevent the closing of the pro-
posed merger between Paramount and Viacom."2' The Chancery
Court held,'124 and the Delaware Supreme Court agreed,'25 that the
consequence of the original agreement with Viacom would have been
a change of control in Paramount from its public stockholders to Mr.
Redstone. Thus Paramount's board was required to immediately
maximize the value of the corporation for the stockholders. During
oral argument, Delaware's Supreme Court raised the issue of Mr.
Redstone's potential power after the merger. 26 The control by Mr.
Redstone, according to the court, would provide him with enough vot-
ing power in the future, under certain circumstances, to cause the
breakup of the company, to "cash out" the minority shareholders, or
114. Id. at 1250.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id at 1252.
118. Id. at 1254.
119. Id. at 1256.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1254-55.
122. Id. at 1256.
123. Id. at 1246.
124. Id. at 1265.
125. Paramount Communications Inc v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del.
1994).
126. See Videotape of Oral Argument from Paramount Communications Inc. v.
QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) (argument of B. Ostrager) (on file with
author).
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to materially alter the equity interests of the minority public
shareholders. 2 7
Paramount argued that Time was controlling; the merger was the
culmination of strategic analyses and discussions by Paramount and its
directors for many years and with many companies. 128 In addition,
because the decision to merge with Viacom was made before any
other bidder emerged,129 the business judgment rule should have pro-
tected the decision. Paramount argued that Revlon was inapplicable
because, as no breakup of Paramount was contemplated, the action
did not fit within either of the Revlon triggering circumstances speci-
fied in the Time case.' 30 In addition, because the merger was a strate-
gic decision like the original merger in Time, the board had an
absolute right to protect it by including the anti-takeover devices in
the agreement. 13
Delaware's Supreme Court disagreed with these arguments:
The Paramount defendants have misread the holding of [Time].
Contrary to their argument, our decision in [Time] expressly states
that the two general scenarios... are not the ONLY instances where
"Revlon duties" may be implicated.... Moreover, the instant case
is clearly within the first general scenario set forth in [Time]. The
Paramount Board, albeit unintentionally, had "initiated an active
bidding process seeking to sell itself" by agreeing to sell control of
the corporation to Viacom in circumstances where another otential
acquiror (QVC) was equally interested in being a bidder1 32
The court's statement clarified the Time decision by encompassing the
Barkan "change of control" formulation within Time's definition of
the Revlon trigger. This subjected Paramount's board to Revlon's re-
quirements. Therefore the court did not grant the protection of the
business judgment rule to Paramount's board because the strategic al-
liance with Viacom was predicated on a sale of control to Redstone in
the original agreement. Yet in Time the same court declined "to ex-
tend Revlon's application to corporate transactions simply because
they might be construed as putting a corporation either 'in play' or 'up
127. Id.
128. Brief for Appellant at 15, Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network,
Inc., 635 A.2d 1245 (Del. Ch. 1993) (Nos. 427 & 428)[hereinafter Brief for Appellant].
129. QVC claimed that Paramount knew full well that QVC would make an offer.
Barry Diller, QVC's CEO, claimed, "Notwithstanding my constantly saying to Mr.
Davis, which I was doing for clearly tactical reasons, that when I had something to say
to him I would pick up the phone and call him, he consistently said to me, I know you
are after my company." Mr. Davis testified that his intent was not to dissuade a hos-
tile bid from Diller, but that he "assumed there was no bid [and] took [Diller] at his
word." QVC Chancery, 635 A.2d at 1249 n.5.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17 (listing the two circumstances trig-
gering Revlon duties).
131. Brief for Appellant at 17.
132. Paramount Communications Inc v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 47 (Del.
1994) (italicized emphasis added).
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for sale.' ,133 In addition, the court's concession that Paramount had
been "unintentionally" put "in play" by its board is a warning to all
directors that they must operate with extra caution when considering
approval of transactions that affect the control structure of corpora-
tions. Whereas Time arguably favored directors' discretion over
shareholders' economic interests, at least in the short term, QVC sig-
nals a reversal-directors must now take special care to protect share-
holders' interests in any transaction which might constitute a "change
of control."
D. Distinguishing QVC from Time
Some might suggest that the QVC decision reversed Time, at least
with respect to its Revlon holding, because Delaware's Supreme Court
did not defer to the business judgment of Paramount's board in its
selection of a merger partner. The cases are factually different, how-
ever. Most importantly, although Warner's shareholders would have
owned sixty-two percent of the merged Time-Warner,' M these shares
would be widely held, 35 whereas Redstone himself would have owned
approximately seventy percent of the merged Paramount-Viacom en-
tity.' 36 In addition, Paramount's board negotiated a premium from
Viacom for its shareholders; this fact was a tacit acknowledgement
that control of the company was for sale. The board, however, most
likely was misled by Time's holding, which suggested that strategic
mergers like this one, which would result in a continuing entity, would
not put a company "in play." Unfortunately for Paramount, Time
confused the meaning of Revlon.
Still, Paramount v. QVC "is merely one of an unbroken line of cases
that seek[s] to prevent the conflicts of interest that arise in the field of
mergers and acquisitions by demanding that directors act with scrupu-
lous concern for fairness to shareholders."' 137 It is consistent with its
predecessors: Time, Barkan, and Revlon. The problem with QVC is
that the case is likely to discourage mergers where one party is con-
trolled by an individual or group that wishes to maintain its equity
position in the combined corporation, because under the QVC facts,
such transactions create the risk of putting a partner corporation "in
play" and therefore subject to Revlon's auction requirements.
133. Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1151 (Del.
1989) (citing Citron v. Fairchild Clamera, 569 A.2d 53 (Del. 1989) and Mills Acquisi-
tion Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1285 n.35 (Del. 1988)).
134. See supra text accompanying note 59.
135. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (quoting Barkan v. Amsted Indus.,
567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989)).
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I1. AVOIDING QVC BY A POOLING OF INTERESTS
QVC raises some interesting questions for corporations controlled
by individual stockholders or groups of stockholders. Why should a
company like IBM, with widespread ownership of its shares, be able
to merge with a similarly situated corporation without fear of interfer-
ence with the transaction, while a company like Microsoft, ostensibly
controlled by a block of shares, would be unable to engage in the
same transaction due to the fear that its offer, under QVC, would put
the other party "in play?"' 38 In the latter case a competitor could, in
good faith, enter the fray on the premise that it was not offered the
same opportunity to bid for the target, even if the target company's
board determined that the partner it chose was the "best fit" for the
future. The shareholders could walk away with more short-term
value, but the new entity might not be as efficient as the one contem-
plated by the board and could offer less long-term value, either be-
cause of the increased cost of the transaction or because a merger with
the hostile suitor will not achieve the synergies that the friendly
merger would have achieved.' 39
In the wake of QVC, it is apparent that companies controlled by a
block of shareholders or a single shareholder will find it difficult or
impossible to participate in a friendly merger while maintaining a sub-
stantial interest in the combined corporation. The interests of such a
block would be diluted in the new entity, but the QVC case provides
no guidance as to what level of share ownership in the new entity
138. Review and Outlook, Wall St. J., Dec. 3, 1993, at A12.
139. This Note endeavors to step back and reconsider the purpose of corporate
governance and to strike a balance between the goals of investors and the historical
purpose of the corporation. At one end of the debate is the argument that the corpo-
ration is a creation of the state, conceived originally as a privilege to be conferred on
specific entities for the public good and welfare. Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosen-
blum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Direc-
tors, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 187, 244 (1991). As with any legal construct, the rules
governing it must be justified on the basis of economic and social utility, not the in-
trinsic right of shareholders. Id. The public corporation is the central productive ele-
ment of the United States economy, and the health and stability of the economy
depend on the ability of corporations to maintain healthy and stable business opera-
tions over the long-term and to compete in world markets. Id. at 192. Moreover, the
corporation affects employees, communities, suppliers, and customers. Id. Rules of
corporate governance and ownership, therefore, must take into account many more
interests than rules that treat the stockholder simply as an owner of private property.
Id.
An opposing view argues that corporations are organized primarily to maximize
shareholder wealth. This theory was expressed in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.:
A business corporation is organized and carried on for the profit of the
stockholders. The powers of directors are to be employed for that end. The
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that
end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself.
170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). While these theories should not be mutually exclu-
sive, it is apparent that Delaware's Supreme Court decisions have favored the view of
the corporation as an investment device.
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constitutes a "change of control" in the other constituent corporation.
In QVC, Delaware's Supreme Court had no difficulty determining
that the transaction would result in a "change of control" because a
single shareholder would have owned seventy percent of the new
company's shares. What if, however, only forty-nine percent of an en-
tity is owned by a single shareholder or control block? In some cases
thirty-five percent or even thirty percent ownership of voting shares
might be considered a control block. 4 ' This is no trifling issue be-
cause many corporations, including CBS, Microsoft, Turner Broad-
casting, and the former McCaw Cellular, are or were controlled by a
single shareholder or block of shares. 4' Should these types of corpo-
rations be disadvantaged in the merger market simply because they
are controlled by a single, talented, managing executive?
Boards should be able to proceed with such mergers without trig-
gering Revlon responsibilities by instead including protective provi-
sions in the terms of the merger agreement for the benefit of minority,
non-controlling shareholders. Delaware's corporations statute ap-
proves of arrangements that preserve the voting power of sharehold-
ers, such as supermajority voting provisions, 142 and Delaware's
Supreme Court has approved of limitations on board representa-
140. For example, during August 1994, American General Corp. sued Unitrin Inc.'s
board in Delaware to force Unitrin's board to negotiate a merger with American
General, a hostile suitor. Arthur Buckler & Greg Steinmetz, Unitrin Is Sued By
American General Corp., Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1994, at A4. Unitrin's board had re-
jected American General's takeover proposal, stating that the company was not for
sale. Id. Unitrin's board also authorized a stock buyback and adopted a poison-pill
defense. Id. The American General lawsuit, relying on the QVC decision, argued
that the stock buyback would result in a change of control because it would increase
the ownership stake of five Unitrin directors to 28% from 23%. Id. Unitrin's by-laws
require 75% shareholder approval to sell the company, so if five directors owned 25%
they could block a deal. Id. Therefore, the suit concluded, the buyback would shift
control of the company from a "fluid aggregation of unaffiliated stockholders" to five
directors. Id.
See also Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 579 (2d Cir. 1962) (suggesting
28.3% shareholder "almost certain to have share control as a practical matter"); Cheff
v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Del. 1964) (indicating that sale of a significant block of
stock should command a control premium); Freedman v. Restaurant Assoc. Indus.,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,502 (Del. Ch. 1987) (finding 37% of voting stock to
represent effective control).
141. As of December 31, 1993, Laurence Tisch and his brother, Preston R. Tisch,
controlled 19.77% of the voting shares of CBS. CBS Inc., Proxy Statement 10-11
(1994). As of September 30, 1993, William Gates and Paul Allen, co-founders of
Microsoft Corporation, held 39% of Microsoft's common stock and voting power.
Microsoft Corporation, Proxy Statement 3 (1993). As of March 31, 1994, R. E. "Ted"
Turner controlled approximately 65% of the voting power of Turner Broadcasting
System. Turner Broadcasting System Inc., Proxy Statement 6 (1994). As of February
28, 1994, Craig McCaw controlled approximately 62% of the voting power of McCaw
Cellular Communications. McCaw Cellular Communications Inc., Proxy Statement 8
(1994).
142. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(4)(1993).
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tion'4 3 while in other cases it has protected shareholder voting power
where management or director decisions have threatened to interfere
with shareholder representation. 44
While the QVC court specifically stated that it expressed no opinion
on whether such stockholder protective devices would have changed
its decision, 45 it certainly left the matter open to consideration. Inclu-
sion of, for example, a supermajority vote provision, likely would have
some impact on a court's decision as to whether or not a change of
control has occurred. To an average shareholder,146 however, such a
provision is not very meaningful. This is because the owner of a large
block of shares would still wield considerably greater influence on the
outcome of any decision than an average shareholder. 47 Beyond vot-
ing power, an average shareholder would receive more protection
from actual limitations on what a board of directors or controlling
shareholder could do to affect the corporation after the merger. If the
limitations were significant enough to guarantee a long-term interest
in the corporation for the minority, non-controlling stockholder, then
a board would be justified in accepting a transaction that offers better
long-term prospects for the corporation, despite a change in control.
A merger structured as a pooling of interests fits this description.
A. The Pooling Criteria
A pooling of interests is a special form of stock-for-stock merger
that provides significant financial advantages to the combined en-
tity.' 48 Before a transaction qualifies for treatment as a pooling of
interests, it must meet several conditions. Accounting Principles
Board Opinion No. 16, Business Combinations,149 describes these re-
quirements. These criteria are divided into three groups: (1) attrib-
utes of the combining companies; (2) manner of combining interests;
and (3) absence of planned transactions. 5 The Attributes Criteria
143. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1337-38 (Del.
1987).
144. Paramount Communications Inc v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 n.1 1
(Del. 1994) (citing instances where Delaware's courts have acted to protect share-
holder voting rights).
145. Id. at 42 n.12.
146. This Note assumes that the "average shareholder" is an individual investor, as
opposed to a professional or institutional investor.
147. Mark I. Steinberg, Nightmare on Main Street: The Paramount Picture Horror
Show, 16 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 11 n.75 (1991).
148. In particular, poolings allow corporations to record their combined assets at
historical values. This allows the surviving entity to avoid recording goodwill-the
fair value of acquired assets over their historical cost-which, if recorded, must be
amortized against earnings over a specified period of time, up to 40 years. This results
in greater annual earnings than if the corporations had merged by means of a business
combination requiring the recognition of goodwill.
149. Business Combinations, Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 16 (Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. 1970).
150. Id.
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are: (a) each of the combining companies is autonomous and has not
been a subsidiary of another corporation within two years before the
plan of combination is initiated;' 5 ' and, (b) each of the combining
companies is independent of the other combining companies.
52
The Combining Criteria are: (a) the combination must be effected
in a single transaction or completed in accordance with a specific plan
within one year of the plan's initiation; 5 3 (b) one corporation (the
issuing corporation) must offer and issue only common stock in ex-
change for substantially all (ninety percent) of the outstanding voting
stock of the combining company at the date the plan is consum-
mated; 54 (c) none of the combining companies changes the equity in-
terest of the voting common stock in contemplation of effecting the
combination within two years before initiation of the plan of consum-
mation or between the dates of initiation or consummation;155 (d)
none of the combining companies may reacquire shares of voting
common stock except for purposes other than the business combina-
tion, and no company reacquires more than a normal number of
shares between the dates of the plan's initiation and consummation;
56
(e) the ratio of the interest of an individual common stockholder to
those of other common stockholders in a combining company remains
the same as a result of the exchange of stock to effect the combina-
tion; 57 (f) the voting rights in the combined corporation are immedi-
ately exercisable by the stockholders; and 58 (g) the combination must
be completed at the specified date of consummation with no provi-
sions pending With respect to the issue of securities or other
consideration. 59
Absence of Planned Transactions requires that: (a) the combined
corporation may not agree, directly or indirectly, to retire or reacquire
stock issued to effect the combination; 60 (b) the combined corpora-
tion must not enter into other financial arrangements for the benefit
of former stockholders of a combining company; and,' (c) the com-
bined corporation must not plan to dispose of a significant part of the
assets of the combining companies within two years after the combi-
nation, unless the assets represent duplicate facilities. 62
151. Id. 46.
152. Id
153. Id. 47.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id
160. Id. 48.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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These conditions ensure the independence of the constituent corpo-
rations prior to the merger.163 They also provide extra protection to
stockholders by ensuring that stockholder equity interests are not di-
minished before the transaction is consummated." 6 Also, the absence
of plans to dispose of corporate assets (Group 3) automatically
removes the transaction from the second Revlon category-transac-
tions resulting in the breakup of the company. 165
B. Enforceability of a Pooling Agreement
While a pooling of interests is an accounting concept, the legal doc-
uments memorializing the agreement ensure compliance with the cri-
teria to preserve the pooling treatment. A merger agreement, like any
other contract, is a set of conditions, promises, and representations.
When a board insists that the merger be structured as a pooling of
interests,'166 it incorporates the conditions, promises, and representa-
tions required for a pooling into the agreement itself. Because a
163. Professor Floyd Beams most clearly described these criteria as follows:
Attributes of Combining Companies:
1. Autonomous ("two year" rule)
2. Independent ("10% rule")
Manner of Combining Interests:
1. Single transaction (or completed within one year after initiation)
2. Exchange of common stock (90% "substantially all" rule)
3. No equity changes in contemplation of combination ("two year" rule)
4. Shares reacquired only for purposes other than combination
5. No change in proportionate equity interests
6. Voting rights immediately exercisable
7. Combination resolved at consummation (no pending provisions)
Absence of Planned Transactions:
1. Issuing company does not agree to reacquire shares
2. Issuing company does not make deals to benefit former stockholders
3. Issuing company does not plan to dispose of assets within two years
Floyd A. Beams, Advanced Accounting 10 (3rd ed. 1985).
164. The twelve criteria were established to prevent abuse of the special features of
the pooling of interests method of combining corporations. One such feature is the
requirement that the corporate financial statements reflect consolidated activity for
the combined corporation for the full reporting period, as opposed to reporting com-
bined results from the date of combination. Prior to APB Opinion No. 16, aggressive
corporations would acquire other corporations with income during the annual period
and consolidate the combined corporation by the pooling method, thus creating "in-
stant earnings" for the acquiring corporation.
Another abuse included the practice of immediately selling off the assets of ac-
quired corporations to recognize a gain on the sale, again distorting actual income
from operations. Finally, prior to APB Opinion No. 16, accounting professionals dis-
agreed as to whether all twelve criteria must be met to allow a merger to be ac-
counted for as a pooling of interests. This resulted in some business combinations
being accounted for as "partial poolings" while others were being accounted for as
poolings because some, although not all, of the criteria were present. Telephone In-
terview with Donald F. Moran, Partner, Coopers & Lybrand, New York, N.Y. (Sept.
8, 1994).
165. See infra text accompanying note 175.
166. For example, for the initial merger contemplated between Time and Warner,
Warner's board reportedly was prepared to insist on a pooling transaction. Para-
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promise is a statement of intention coupled with a commitment to act
in accordance with that statement, making a promise to comply with
the pooling criteria with an intent not to do so is a misrepresentation
of fact.167 A majority shareholder of the corporation issuing the
shares to effect the transaction is bound by the pooling conditions be-
cause the conditions are material to the agreement. 168 The threat of
damages or rescission due to a breach of the representations required
to qualify for a pooling ensures that the majority shareholder will not
disavow the transaction's conditions. 169
C. Pooling Criteria and "Change of Control"
The pooling of interests requirements should protect a transaction
from the "change of control" test that triggered Revlon duties in the
QVC case. While "control" in some contexts is easy to define, when
considering "control" of a public corporation the definition is neces-
sarily more complicated. It is unlikely that the QVC court contem-
plated that a change of control could consist of a simple change in
management akin to, for example, the removal of a chief executive
officer in response to complaints from dissident shareholders. 7
More likely, the court was concerned with "unfettered" control, or
control without limitation, such as Mr. Redstone would have had if
the QVC-Paramount merger had been consummated. Thus, consider-
ing the Delaware Supreme Court's concerns with the sale of control in
QVC, a pooling of interests survives this test by reducing the court's
fear that the rights of minority stockholders would be ignored by a
majority block. The QVC court listed several concerns:
mount Communications Inc. v. Time, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at
93,269 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
167. John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, Contracts § 9-19, at 365 (3d ed. 1990)
(footnote omitted).
168. When a board bargains for a pooling to consummate a merger, a failure to
maintain the pooling is "so substantial and fundamental as to strongly tend to defeat
the object of the parties making the contract." Callanan v. Powers, 92 N.E. 747, 752
(N.Y. 1910). Such circumstances justify an award of damages or even rescission. See,
e.g., Doubleday & Co. v. Curtis, 763 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1985) (granting rescission for
non-performance of contract in manner specified by agreement); Magnaleasing, Inc.
v. Staten Island Mall, 428 F. Supp. 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that material, fraud-
ulent misrepresentations justified rescission); Clanton v. Smith, 567 N.Y.S.2d 67
(App. Div. 1991) (holding that defendant's failure to perform as agreed justified re-
scission of contract).
169. See supra note 168.
170. For example, when Laurence Tisch became the CEO at CBS, no one argued
that any resulting change in management philosophy entitled the shareholders to im-
mediate maximization of the value of their shares. Ken Auletta, Three Blind Mice
136-85 (1st ed. 1991). The only time the "change of control" issue came into play was
when CBS was considering whether ownership by Tisch of over 25% would affect
CBS' ability to continue owning more than one radio station, television station, or
newspaper in any one market. Id. at 151.
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Following [the] consummation, there will be a controlling share-
holder who will have the voting power to: [1] elect directors; [2]
cause a break-up of the corporation; [3] merge it with another com-
pany; [4] cash-out the public stockholders; [5] amend the certificate
of incorporation; [6] sell all or substantially all of the corporate as-
sets; or [7] otherwise alter materially the nature of the corporation
and the public stockholders' interests. Irrespective of the present
• . . Board's vision of a long-term strategic alliance .... the new
controlling stockholder [could] alter that vision.171
As for the first and last concerns, director election and the nature of
the corporate vision, any influential shareholder, not necessarily a
controlling shareholder, could wield the power to affect the composi-
tion of the merged entity's board of directors or its strategic vision.
For instance, less than two years after the Time-Warner merger (the
one that actually was consummated), Steven J. Ross led a boardroom
coup d'etat at Time-Warner resulting in the resignation of co-Chief
Executive and board member N. J. Nicholas. 172 The irony is, of
course, that the Delaware Supreme Court blessed this merger in the
Time case. In fact, in most large corporations, control stems not from
ownership, but rather from incumbency and control of the proxy ma-
chinery.173 This is because not all stockholders participate in the vot-
ing process and because controlling persons generally command the
loyalty of other stockholders. 74
Considering the court's second and sixth concerns-break-up of the
corporation and sale of corporate assets-the unique nature of a pool-
ing prohibits plans to sell non-duplicate corporate assets of the com-
bining companies for two years after the merger. By seeking a
pooling, the combining corporations represent that such transactions
are not planned or intended for the new entity.1 75
The QVC court expressed concern that the controlling shareholder
could cash-out the public stockholders. In a pooling of interests, how-
ever, the combined corporation may not agree, directly or indirectly,
to retire or reacquire all or part of the common stock issued to effect
the combination. By meeting this requirement the parties represent
that a "cash-out" will not occur. 176 In the Chancery Court's QVC
171. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del.
1994).
172. Paul Farhi & Steven Mufson, Time Warner Co-CEO Quits in Abrupt Move;
Nicholas Disagreed on Strategic Vision, Wash. Post, February 21, 1992, at Fl:
Nicholas' departure was officially termed a resignation, but people at the
company said the 52 year-old executive was forced out by the company's
board following an extraordinary meeting .... Nicholas has repeatedly
clashed with Time-Warner Chairman and co-CEO Steven J. Ross over the
company's direction and ways to boost its sluggish stock price.
173. Lewis D. Solomon et. al, Corporations 748 (2d ed. 1988)
174. Id.
175. See supra text accompanying note 162.
176. See supra text accompanying note 160.
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opinion, Chancellor Jacobs emphasized the fact that Paramount's
board had not obtained, or even bargained for, any structural protec-
tion to ensure the continuity of Paramount's current shareholders (or
their successors) in a merged enterprise. 77 The Delaware Supreme
Court's QVC decision reiterated this theme. 78 If the merger was
structured as a pooling of interests, however, such actions would jeop-
ardize the pooling treatment and result in a material breach of the
agreement to merge.
In SEC Accounting Series Release 146-A, the SEC states that if an
entity were to complete a pooling and a very short time thereafter
repurchase an equivalent amount of shares, such a purchase could af-
fect the status of the combination and bar pooling accounting. 7 9 Ad-
mittedly, the SEC's failure to define "a very short time" makes this
guideline somewhat vague; however, this lack of specificity reflects the
SEC's preference for the private sector to develop and establish ac-
counting principles. 180 Still, from this language it is apparent that the
SEC requires close scrutiny of a stock reacquisition to ensure that the
substance of the transaction is not in fact a "cash out," as such action
is evidence of an attempt to circumvent the pooling criteria.'"" This
would also defeat the stated purpose of a pooling, that is "the sharing
of rights and risks among constituent shareholder groups."' 1a Because
failure to comply with the pooling criteria and representations after
the merger is consummated (1) is a material breach of the merger
agreement, and (2) would raise concern at the SEC, a majority share-
holder would be foolish to take such a risk.
177. QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 1267
n.42 (Del. Ch. 1993), aff'd, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) (citing the types of protection
contemplated).
178. This theme was stated best in the appellee's brief: "Here there is no 'long
term' for the stockholders. A majority of their equity is being cashed out now, and
the minority remnant can be extinguished by Redstone unilaterally or transformed
into something completely different whenever he so desires." Brief for Appellee at
32, Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 635 A.2d 1245 (Del. Ch.
1993) (Nos. 427 & 428).
179. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 146-A, reprinted in Ronald J. Murray et
al., The Coopers & Lybrand SEC Manual § 50335d (6th ed. 1993).
180. See Ronald J. Murray et al., The Coopers & Lybrand SEC Manual § 14030
(6th ed. 1993) (quoting SEC Accounting Series Release No. 150 which states: "[The
Commission intends to continue its policy of looking to the private sector for leader-
ship in establishing and improving accounting principles and standards through FASB
[Fimancial Accounting Standards Board] with the expectation that the body's conclu-
sions will promote the interests of investors.").
181. A stock repurchase that is part of a "systematic pattern of reacquisition," for
example, the performance of a contractual obligation that requires a contribution of
stock to a union pension plan, would not be a violation of the criteria.
182. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 130, reprinted in Ronald J. Murray et al.,
The Coopers & Lybrand SEC Manual § 50334 (6th ed. 1993). While most of the com-
mentary on the purpose of a pooling focuses on "risk sharing," in this context we are
focusing on "right sharing."
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The pooling criteria do not specifically address the remaining con-
cerns, that the controlling shareholder will amend the certificate of
incorporation or seek out another merger. The limitation on planned
transactions, however, still applies to any contemplated entity for the
prescribed time period. 83
In addition, compliance with the pooling criteria assures that the
value of the stock issued to consummate the merger has not been
manipulated in contemplation of the merger.184 News reports and
QVC's attorneys highlighted the fact that Redstone had purchased
Viacom stock in the months preceding the agreement with Para-
mount.185 It was alleged that heavy trading of Viacom stock by Red-
stone helped boost the price of the stock and artificially increased the
value of the merger package offered to Paramount's stockholders. 18 6
Apparently Paramount's board was not aware of these transactions
despite a study by the investment banking firm of Smith Barney that
analyzed the effect of the purchases on Viacom's stock price. 187 This
type of trading activity disqualifies a transaction from pooling treat-
ment because it violates the requirement that neither of the combin-
ing companies may reacquire shares of the stock to be issued to effect
the combination except for purposes other than the business
combination. 88
Moreover, although the shareholders would be turning over manag-
ing control to the controlling shareholder, they would not be required
to do so without having approved this decision. Besides ensuring a
long-term commitment to the shareholders, a pooling of interests
transaction requires a vote by the shareholders because their stock
would be converted into the stock of the issuing corporation.8 9 It
183. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
184. See supra text accompanying note 156.
185. See Randall Smith & Johnnie L. Roberts, Viacom's Proposal To Buy Para-
mount Got Helping Hand, Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1993, at A3. See Videotape, supra note
126 (argument of H. Wachtell).
186. Smith & Roberts, supra note 185.
187. QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 1249
n.6 (Del. Ch. 1993), aff'd, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). The report concluded that the
trading had no material effect on the price of the shares offered to Paramount's share-
holders. Id.
188. See supra text accompanying note 156.
189. Section 251(c) of Delaware's General Corporation Law provides in relevant
part: "The agreement [of merger or consolidation] ... shall be submitted to the stock-
holders of each constituent corporation... for the purpose of acting on the agree-
ment .... The agreement shall be considered and a vote taken for its adoption or
rejection." Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8 § 251(c) (1993). Section 251(0, however, creates
exceptions to this requirement if:
(1) the agreement or merger does not amend in any respect the certificate of
incorporation of [the] constituent corporation[s], (2) each share of stock of
[the] constituent corporation[s] outstanding immediately prior to the effec-
tive date of the merger is to be an identical outstanding or treasury share of
the surviving corporation after the effective date of the merger, and (3) ...
the authorized unissued shares or the treasury shares of common stock of
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would be disingenuous of the Delaware Supreme Court to suggest, as
the surviving corporation to be issued or delivered under the plan of merger
plus those initially issuable upon conversion of any other shares, securities or
obligations to be issued or delivered under such plan do not exceed 20% of
the shares of common stock of such constituent corporation outstanding im-
mediately prior to the effective date of the merger.
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 251(f) (1993) (emphasis added).
Recall that the only reason Time's shareholders would have had an opportunity to
approve the merger is because New York Stock Exchange rules required a share-
holder vote for the issuance of so many shares. See supra note 72. Delaware law did
not require a vote because Time's certificate of incorporation would not have been
amended, and the outstanding stock held by Time's shareholders would not have been
altered by the transaction. Time, however, would have issued more stock to Warner's
shareholders than were actually outstanding. Thus the only plausible explanation for
why Delaware law would not have required approval of the merger by Time's share-
holders under § 251(f)(3) is because Time would not have been deemed the surviving
corporation in the deal.
In the Time case, Warner was designated as the surviving corporation. In other
words, Delaware law would have protected the interests of Time's shareholders by
allowing them to approve the transaction if Time had been deemed the surviving cor-
poration. This is because Time would have delivered to Warner's stockholders more
than 20% of its outstanding shares (measured on the day before the merger) to com-
plete the transaction.
By requiring shareholder approval of mergers in § 251(c) but providing for exemp-
tions in § 251(f), the drafters of Delaware's General Corporation Law acknowledged
that issuing 20% of a company's outstanding shares is a significant enough transaction
to require that the will of the shareholders should trump the directors' discretion.
Contrary to the Time Chancery opinion that "[tihe shareholders of Time would have
'suffered' dilution, of course, but they would suffer the same type of dilution upon the
[sic] public distribution of new stock," Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,280 (Del.
Ch. 1989), the provision in the statute is evidence that the Delaware legislature con-
sidered dilution in excess of 20% to be something more than that suffered upon the
issuance of new stock.
The Delaware courts should address this issue by recognizing the right to a share-
holder vote in either constituent corporation (not only the designated survivor), if
either one issues shares in excess of 20% of shares outstanding. There is ample sup-
port for imposing this requirement. First, Delaware's corporation statute recognizes
that an acquisition effected in such a manner is more than simple dilution of share-
holder interests akin to the public issuance of new stock. The Delaware courts or
legislature might note that the New York Stock Exchange also recognizes that a trans-
action of this magnitude is significant enough to require a shareholder vote. See supra
note 72.
Additionally, it is possible that the drafters of § 251(f) did not foresee that an issu-
ing corporation might not be the surviving corporation. Nevertheless, the constituent
corporations' boards should not be able to circumvent the stockholder approval re-
quirement simply by deeming the non-issuing entity as the survivor. Circumvention
of a shareholder vote in this manner would be a triumph of form over substance, yet,
without the New York Stock Exchange requirements, this is what would have oc-
curred if the original Time-Warner agreement had survived. Specifically, shareholder
approval should be required for:
Any issuance of securities where the total voting power of the [constituent]
corporation's outstanding securities after the issuance exceeds by twenty
percent or more the total voting power of securities outstanding immediately
prior to the transaction [had the constituent remained an independent
entity].
John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm Shareholder
Model of Corporate Governance, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 1313, 1379 n.324 (1992).
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it did in QVC,190 that provisions protecting the voting power of minor-
ity shareholders could prevent the auction duty from being triggered if
the courts would not respect the validity of an actual shareholder vote
approving a merger with the controlling shareholder's corporation. If
a majority of the non-controlling shareholders approved such a trans-
action by an informed vote, then such a transaction must be presumed
to be fair.191
Compliance with the pooling criteria protects the long-term inter-
ests of the non-controlling shareholders, and the shareholder vote
gives these shareholders a say in approval of the transaction. These
protective measures should be enough to allow a board to preserve its
protective devices to fend off a hostile bidder should one enter the
scene. After QVC, however, it is uncertain that a board could even
present a plan for such a merger to the shareholders, as the auction
duty automatically requires the board to shop the company for the
highest bid. For this reason a safe harbor is necessary.
D. Applying the Pooling Criteria
It is important to stress once again that a pooling would simply en-
sure that the board is not committed to a Revlon auction if a hostile
party seeks to interfere with a merger where managing control would
change hands. Under this theory the pooling structure provides a safe
harbor for corporations with widely held public ownership that wish
to participate in mergers with corporations controlled by majority
shareholders without engaging in a costly bidding war.
Accordingly, where corporations agree to merge by a pooling of in-
terests, any protective devices included in the agreement should not
be disturbed. If a competing bid surfaces, the board should have all its
defensive measures, within the limits of Unocal, available to it. If at
this point the shareholders reject the proposed merger, then the board
should not be committed to an auction of the company because the
pooling criteria severely limited the "control" it offered to the other
constituent.
For the above-mentioned reasons, Revlon duties should not be im-
plicated where a transaction is structured as a pooling. Given the
strict criteria for such transactions, shareholder interests are well-pro-
tected. Where majority shareholders are involved, managing control
may shift, but this alone should not trigger Revlon without the addi-
Delaware's courts should recognize that stockholders in the position of Time's
stockholders in 1989 should have had the right to approve the original Time-Warner
agreement. Recognition of the shareholders' right to approve any issuance of stock
which equals or exceeds 20% of the corporation's shares outstanding adequately pro-
tects their interests in these circumstances, and renders a Revlon requirement
unnecessary.
190. 637 A.2d 34, 42 n.12 (Del. 1994).
191. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983).
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tional factors that were present in QVC.192 Though the many prereq-
uisites limit the applicability of a pooling of interests, this proposal
nevertheless provides some room for corporations with controlling
shareholders to participate in mergers and encourages such companies
to continue seeking partners as part of their long-term strategies.
Query what would have occurred if the Paramount-Viacom transac-
tion had been structured as a pooling of interests. Redstone would
not have had the degree of control that the court suggested he would
have had if the first agreement had survived. Paramount's sharehold-
ers might have rejected the merger, but such a decision by the share-
holders should not have committed Paramount's directors to an
auction. Finally, even if the stockholders rejected the first transaction,
Paramount's board would have been free, under Unocal, to exercise
its business judgment to defend against any hostile bid by QVC be-
cause Paramount's board would not have offered unfettered control
to Redstone.
Not all stock-for-stock mergers qualify for pooling treatment.
Given the QVC holding, however, it is likely that the number of pool-
ings will increase in the future, if only because companies now know
that a Paramount-Viacom type transaction could trigger Revlon,
whereas the Time-Warner stock-for-stock agreement did not. After
Time, some commentators suggested that stock-for-stock mergers
were excluded from Revlon's reach,"3 while others have disagreed
with this hypothesis on the theory that excluding such mergers makes
evasion of the auction duty a simple matter. 194
With respect to pooling of interest mergers, this "evasion argu-
ment" can be easily addressed. First, as mentioned, not every stock-
for-stock merger will qualify for pooling treatment, as the require-
ments are very strict.' 95 Second, compliance with the pooling criteria
192. See supra text accompanying note 171.
193. For example one commentator suggested that: "In particular the Supreme
Court's [Time] opinion would seem to exclude from Revlon's reach virtually any com-
bination negotiated at arm's length where the consideration was principally stock."
Gordon, supra note 98, at 1944 n.45.
194. For example it has been suggested that "if transaction planners knew they
could avoid Revlon by structuring a negotiated acquisition as a stock for stock merger,
rather than as a triangular acquisition or a two-party merger with cash or debt consid-
eration, evading the duty to auction control would be a simple matter indeed." Bain-
bridge, supra note 98, at 311.
195. The following additional examples further demonstrate how poolings protect
stockholders.
Hypothetical Case Number One
Macrowink Inc. has ten million shares of common stock outstanding, 60% of which
is owned by its principal shareholder, Calvin. Macrowink's board has agreed that a
strategic merger with Hobbes, Inc., which currently has four million shares spread
among many small stockholders, would benefit both corporations in the long term.
Hobbes' board agrees as well. Because of Calvin's majority interest, however, the
Hobbes' board is fearful that the transaction might put the company "in play," leaving
it to the highest bidder rather than the best long-term partner for the corporation.
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protects shareholders from manipulation of interests by management
Therefore, as a condition to the agreement, Hobbes' board insists that the merger be
structured as a pooling of interests.
Macrowink agrees to issue four million authorized shares in exchange for substan-
tially all of Hobbes four million outstanding shares. After the exchange is completed,
Calvin will still own a controlling interest in the merged entity as his voting common
stock will comprise approximately 43% of all the shares outstanding.
Applying the QVC definition of Revlon's trigger literally, Hobbes, Inc. most likely
would trigger Revlon's requirements due to the great influence that Calvin would
have on the combined company's board and management. A Revlon auction, how-
ever, is not necessary because, even if Calvin were to wield such influence, the com-
pany's activities would be limited by the pooling conditions. For example, the
company would not be able to "cash out" the former Hobbes shareholders because
this would cause the substance of the transaction to be a cash purchase of Hobbes,
thus violating the tenth pooling condition which requires that the combined company
must not agree, directly or indirectly, to reacquire or retire shares issued to effect the
combination.
Moreover, Macrowink is also limited by the requirement that the company must
not plan to dispose of a significant part, except for duplicate assets, of the combining
companies for at least two years after the combination. This means that Calvin, for all
his influence, could not effect the breakup of the company or cause the sale of signifi-
cant assets, at least for the prescribed time. This is certainly enough protection for the
public stockholders because even in a widely-held corporation there is no guarantee
that the company will not engage in such transactions over the long-term.
Because of the limitations on Calvin's control, and because, by definition, a pooling
contemplates a continuing entity, there is no need to impose Revlon duties on Hob-
bes' board. In addition, the strict attributes and combining criteria required in a pool-
ing ensure that the transaction is a good-faith, arms-length agreement. A board
decision to enter a transaction meeting all these requirements should be accorded the
protection of the business judgment rule as Calvin would not have the control that
concerned the QVC court. Furthermore, this type of arms-length transaction would
provide a safe harbor for corporations with controlling shareholders to participate in
mergers without being committed to a bidding war.
Finally, the ultimate decision in a case like this is left to the shareholders of Hobbes,
who must approve the transaction. If they disapprove of the arrangement, at worst
control and ownership remain in the same position as before. If they approve of the
arrangement, deciding that it is in their best interests to tie their fortunes to a talented
executive who also happens to be a majority owner, then at least the cost of the trans-
action will not damage the new corporation.
Hypothetical Case Number Two
Assuming that poolings are exempt from Revlon requirements, company Alpha is
80% owned by a single shareholder, Powers, who commits his corporation to a stock-
for-stock merger with Company Beta, a private corporation not subject to NYSE
rules. Alpha will issue a combination of common and preferred stock to Beta's inves-
tors to effect the merger. Powers is a 15% owner of Beta's outstanding stock and
votes it to provide the margin which approves the merger. After the stock swap Pow-
ers will own approximately 45% of the new entity's outstanding voting stock.
This transaction implicates Revlon even though it was purely a stock swap. First,
there is a change of control in Beta. Second, there are no limitations to offset the
change of control to protect the former Beta stockholders. This is because the trans-
action would not qualify for pooling treatment as the ownership of Beta shares by
Powers violated the independence conditions for a pooling, and the manner in which
the transaction would be consummated violates the combining requirements for a
pooling. Although there is no per se rule as to the percentage of intercompany stock
ownership that violates the independence criteria, it is likely that any amount over
10% fails to meet the requirement. Therefore, this transaction falls outside the safe
harbor.
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of either constituent. Therefore, while Revlon may be necessary to
protect shareholders in some stock-for-stock transactions, it is unnec-
essary when the transaction is a pooling of interests; the protection is
inherent in the nature of the pooling transaction.
CONCLUSION
The QVC decision has two consequences. First, directors must ex-
ercise more care when committing the stockholders to transactions
that might adjust a corporation's control structure, as such transac-
tions may implicate Revlon duties. Second, corporations with control-
ling shareholders will be unable to participate in standard merger
transactions because of the risk that Revlon requirements will be im-
plicated for the partner corporation.
As an alternative, these corporations should be able to avoid Rev-
Ion's implications by structuring mergers as poolings of interests. In
cases that challenge mergers structured as poolings, Delaware's courts
must not require corporate boards to meet Revlon's threshold duties
before according business judgment rule protection to their decisions.
Revlon's requirements are unnecessary in such transactions because
the conditions required to treat the new entity as a pooling of interests
protect the long-term interests of minority shareholders. Recognition
that a pooling of interests merger will not implicate Revlon duties thus
provides a safe harbor for corporations otherwise excluded by the
QVC decision to participate in mergers without committing the part-
ner corporation to an auction or causing a disabling bidding war. This
safe-harbor will effectively protect the interests of the average inves-
tor while promoting fairness in the merger market for corporations
controlled by shareholder blocks by preserving for them the same op-
portunities available to corporations with diffuse ownership.
Other factors, such as dilution, tainted shares, and weakness in the value of the
issuing corporation's stock may diminish the feasibility of a pooling of interests for
many corporations. These problems are beyond the scope of this Note.
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